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A. The Free Trade Agreement and the Procurement Review Board
In 1986, the United States and Canada, in an effort to create a
North American free trade area, began negotiating a free trade act.1 Af-
ter two years of work and an acrimonious political debate in Canada2,
the U.S. and Canada concluded the Free Trade Act (FTA) in 19883. The
FTA went into effect on January 1, 1989.
The purpose of the FrA is to increase economic activity between
the world's largest trading partners by eliminating barriers to the trade of
goods and services, liberalizing conditions for investment, and creating
"conditions of fair competition" in the United States and Canada.4
Somewhat obscured by the significance of the achievement of this
1 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988), Background/Content Summary. Canada and the United States began
trade negotiations with a variety of goals. Canada's Minister for International Trade identified his
government's objectives in a September 26, 1985 report. The objectives included reducing the possi-
bility that Congress would enact laws denying Canadian products access to the United States mar-
ket, eliminating tariffs inhibiting the processing of Canadian resources and abolishing "Buy
American" procurement requirements. BILATERALISM, MULTLATERALISM AND CANADA IN U.S.
TRADE POLICY 79 (W. Diebold, Jr. ed. 1990). The United States government sought the elimination
of both high tariffs that restricted U.S. access to the Canadian market and federal and provincial
non-tariff barriers to trade as well as liberalization of government policies regulating direct United
States investment. Id. at 79-80.
2 The Canadian federal election of November 1988 was fought almost entirely on the issue of
whether Canada should ratify the FTA, with Prime Minister Mulroney's Progressive Conservative
Party advocating ratification and the Liberal Party and the New Democratic Party advocating non-
ratification. The Progressive Conservatives prevailed in the election winning 170 seats to the Liber-
als' 82 and the New Democratic Party's 43. See A Giant Step Closer to North America, Inc., Bus.
Week, Dec. 5, 1988, at 44. See also Canada Still to Decide on L4bn Nuclear Subs Contract, The
Daily Telegraph, Mar. 14, 1989, at 10.
3 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988), Background/Content Summary.
4 U.S. - Canada Free Trade Agreement, Part I, Chapter 1, Objectives and Scope. T.I.A.S. -, 27
LL.M. 281 (1988) [hereinafter FTA].
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binational reduction in trade barriers, is Chapter 13 of the FTA. The
purpose of Chapter 13, Government Procurement, is "the multilateral
liberalization of the international government procurement policies to
provide balanced and equitable opportunities."5 This liberalization is to
be "based on the principles of non-discrimination and fair and open com-
petition for the supply of goods and services" and achieved as "quickly as
possible."6
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI) Agreement
on Government Procurement serves as the foundation for this binational
attempt to liberalize government procurement policies.7 The Agreement
provides the basis for Chapter 13. Article 1301 of Chapter 13 of the
FTA states, "[a]s a further step toward multilateral liberalization and
improvement of the GATT Agreement on Government Procurement,
which includes the annexes thereto, the Parties [the United States and
Canada] shall undertake the obligations of this Chapter."' Chapter 13
creates new and additional opportunities for businesses on both sides of
the Canadian-United States border to bid on federal government con-
tracts on opposite sides of the border. In order to implement the FTA
and the provisions of Chapter 13, the Canadian federal government cre-
ated a new administrative agency, the Procurement Review Board of
Canada (the Board), to adjudicate government procurement disputes.
The Board is the focus of this article. Because the Board is charged
with adjudicating contract disputes arising under Chapter 13 of the
FTA9, its decisions provide an insight into whether Chapter 13 is creat-
ing "for Canada an international undertaking to provide an equitable (i.e.
procedurally fair), transparent (i.e. all details known at outset) and effec-
tive bid challenge system." 10
During 1990, its first full year of existence, the Board drafted nine
opinions in response to procurement bid disputes. An initial analysis of
the decisions by the Board indicates that with minor exceptions, Chapter
5 FrA, Chapter 13, Article 1301: Objective.
6 Id.
7 FrA, Chapter 13, Article 1301 (2). The Agreement is a product of the Tokyo Round of
GATT negotiations and attempts to foster greater international competition in the area of govern-
ment procurement.
8 FrA, Chapter 13, Article 1301 (2).
9 An Act to Implement the Free Trade Act between Canada and the United States of America,
Part II, Section 15, "Complaints," Stat. of Canada ch. 65 (1988) [hereinafter FTA Implementation
Act].
10 This is the language that the Procurement Review Board used to describe its purpose in In
The Matter of: A Complaint by Cardinal Industrial Electronics, No. D89PRF6608-021-0005 (PRB
of Canada Feb. 27, 1990) [hereinafter Cardinal I].
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13 has established an open and effective bid challenge system in the
Board.
B. Importance of the Analysis
An analysis of the Board's decisions and, consequently, the effective-
ness of Chapter 13 of the FTA in creating an open bid dispute system, is
significant for three reasons: the sheer volume of economic activity in-
volved, the Board's potential to serve as a model, and for providing an
insight into the Board's operational impact.
The sheer volume of economic activity represented by government
procurement compels public scrutiny of any procurement system reform.
Total government procurement in Canada, for example, is estimated to
total $Cdn 60 billion annually or eighteen per cent of the Canadian
Gross Domestic Product (CDP).1' Similarly, total United States pro-
curement approximates sixteen per cent of the United States GDP. 2
Consequently, any effort to liberalize international trade that ignores the
procurement sector limits the potential impact of the reform.
Chapter 13, and the Board specifically, can serve as a model in at
least three ways. As an expansion of the GATT Agreement on Govern-
ment Procurement, Chapter 13 is a model for future evolution of that
Agreement. Second, the Chapter provides a model for incorporating
government procurement and bid dispute resolution in the proposed
U.S.-Mexico free trade negotiations. Finally, an effective procurement
system may justify the expansion of the FTA system to include the fifty
states and ten Canadian provinces which are currently outside the juris-
diction of Chapter 13.
A successful binational procurement process also would have signifi-
cant practical impacts. The creation of an open government procurement
process should produce benefits for consumers. By opening procurement
to lower cost foreign suppliers, international procurement may reduce
consumer prices, alleviate pressures to raise taxes and increase economic
integration.
This article is organized into three primary sections: an analysis of
the nine Board decisions of 1990, an overview of the practical implica-
tions of these decisions, and a conclusion. The nine decisions are scruti-
nized as to whether they provide equal, non-discriminatory treatment of
United States and Canadian firms, how they define the jurisdiction of the
11 D. Lemieux, 29 LEs CAHIERS DE DROIT 369, 373 (1988). Lemieux includes procurement by
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Board, the remedies they offer complainants, and their procedural and
administrative consistency. The practical applications of the decisions
are also analyzed in terms of Canadian government implementation of
Board recommendations.
II. BACKGROUND
Chapter 13 of the FTA is the central constellation in the legal gal-
axy composing government procurement. The Chapter's purpose is "the
multilateral liberalization of international government procurement poli-
cies to provide balanced and equitable opportunities."13 Chapter 13 in-
corporates the GATT Agreement on Government Procurement, and in
Article 1302 of Chapter 13, the U.S. and Canada "reaffirm their rights
and obligations" under this Agreement.14 Article 1302 expands coverage
of the FTA from the base prescribed by the GATT Code.15 Most signifi-
cantly, the Article reduces the threshold for procurement covered by
Chapter 13 to $25,000 ($Cdn 33,000) from the minimum value of
$171,000 ($Cdn 213,000) established in the GATT Agreement.16 As a
result, any procurement falling between $25,000 ($Cdn 33,000) and
$171,000 ($Cdn 213,000) is governed by the FTA unless it is reserved for
small business, national security reasons, or because the procurement in-
volves an agency, department or product not covered by the Act.
Chapter 13 also outlines the expanded procedural obligations of the
United States and Canada under the FTA (Article 1305), provides for
the monitoring and exchange of information (Article 1306) and commits
the two nations to further negotiations.
Chapter 13 alone, however, does not define the government procure-
ment system under the FTA. A series of annexes to the Chapter identify
the United States and Canadian government agencies and products
which fall within the jurisdiction of the Act17 and the principles guiding
the bid challenge procedures." Chapter 13's jurisdictional reach is
broad: twenty-two Canadian government departments, ten Canadian
agencies,19 eleven United States government departments and forty
United States government agencies and commissions fall within its
13 FIA, Chapter 13, Article 1301 (1).
14 FIA, Chapter 13, Article 1302: Reaffirmation of Existing Obligations.
15 FrA, Chapter 13, Article 1304.
16 FTA, Chapter 13, Article 1304 (2).
17 FTA, Chapter 13, Annex 1304.3.
18 FTA, Chapter 13, Annex 1305.
19 The Canada - U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Chapter 13: Government Procurement, Govern-





A. Free Trade Implementation Act
Chapter 13 is complemented by the Free Trade Agreement Imple-
mentation Act. The FTA Implementation Act was passed by the Cana-
dian parliament to implement the Free Trade Agreement. Part II of the
FTA Implementation Act creates the Procurement Review Board.21 The
Board itself is governed by a series of rules, the "PRB Regulations",
which, in turn, are a part of the FTA Implementation Act.
Under the FTA Implementation Act, the Board consists of not
more than five members, including a chairperson.22 The Board is vested
with "all such powers, rights and privileges as are vested in a superior
court of record" in regard to "attendance, swearing and examination of
witnesses, the production and inspection of documents, the enforcement
of orders and other matters necessary or proper for the due exercise of its
jurisdiction."23
Section 15 of the Free Trade Implementation Act provides that sup-
pliers may bring complaints to the Board "in relation to any aspect of the
procurement related to a contract awarded or to be awarded by a govern-
mental institution" that fall within the prescribed dollar amounts.24
The Act does not grant the Board anything more than the power to
make recommendations where it rules that a government agency has not
complied with the FTA in its procurement procedures.25
The PRB Regulations governing operation of the Board are divided
into two parts: Administration, and Practice and Procedure Before the
Board. The Administration section outlines the membership of the
Board, the duties and functions of the Board Chairperson, the Board's
staff, and the Board's mandate. The PRB Regulations identify a two-
part mandate for the Board. The Board's purpose is to "receive com-
plaints and make determinations and conduct investigations in relation
thereto" and to make recommendations in .writing to government agen-
cies or departments regarding any aspect of their procurement.26
Part II of the Regulations (Practice and Procedure Before the
Board) identifies the steps for filing complaints before the Board, the time
20 Id
21 FrA Implementation Act, Part IT, Procurement Review Board § 14 (1).
22 FrA Implementation Act, § 14 (1).
23 FrA Implementation Act, § 14 (2).
24 FrA Implementation Act, § 15.
25 FrA Implementation Act, § 19.
26 d
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limit for bringing complaints, and the Board's ability to investigate dis-
putes, issue reports, make determinations and express opinions.
III. STANDARDS FOR ANALYSIS OF THE BOARD'S DECISIONS
Whether the Board is creating an open, efficient, and transparent bid
dispute settlement process can be measured in part by evaluating the
Board's decisions against the provisions of Article 1305 and the Annexes
of Chapter 13 of the FTA, the FTA Implementation Act Section 19
("Recommendations") and the PRB Regulations. Together these
sources provide an overview of whether the Board is acting consistently
with its governing legislation and the procedural requirements of the
Act. Article 1305 of Chapter 13 and the Chapter 13 Annex 1305.3, for
example, provide the normative or subjective standards that the procure-
ment process should meet. Section 19 of the FTA Implementation Act
and the Board Regulations, on the other hand, are more procedural in
nature. They prescribe actions and processes that the Board should un-
dertake in specific circumstances.
A. Article 1305: Expanded Procedural Obligations
Article 1305 forms the heart of Chapter 13. It is the lengthiest arti-
cle in the Chapter, and identifies seven responsibilities which the United
States and Canada assume in the area of government procurement under
the FTA.2 7 The first three obligations are the most important. The pri-
mary obligation of the Article, and the one from which the remaining six
flow, requires the United States and Canada to accord to each others'
goods a standard of treatment "no less favorable than the most favorable
treatment accorded to its own goods."2
Second, and necessarily following from the first obligation, the
United States and Canada are to provide all suppliers with "equal ac-
cess" to pre-solicitation information, and with an equal opportunity to
compete in the pre-notification phase of the procurement.29 This obliga-
tion serves as an umbrella for a number of smaller requirements. The
United States and Canada are to provide all suppliers with "equal oppor-
tunity to be responsive to the requirements of the procuring entity in the
tendering and bidding phase."'30 In addition, the decision criteria to be
used in qualifying potential suppliers, evaluating bids and awarding the
contracts are to be consistent with the requirements outlined in the
27 FTA, Chapter 13, Article 1305.
28 FTA, Chapter 13, Article 1305 (1).
29 FrA, Chapter 13, Article 1305 (2)(a).
30 FTA, Chapter 13, Article 1305 (2)(b).
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tender document, "free of preferences in any form of its own goods" and
"clearly specified in advance."31 The final component of the second pro-I.
cedural obligation is that the parties "make available information on con-
tract awards in the post-award phase" in order to spur competition. 2
Third, the two parties are to have "equitable, timely, transparent
and effective" bid challenge procedures.3
B. Annex 1305.3 Principles Guiding Bid Challenge Procedures
Annex 1305.3 ("Principles Guiding Bid Challenge Procedures") is
the normative companion to Article 1305. Whereas Article 1305 out-
lines the requirements or "spirit of the game" rules guiding the procure-
ment process, Annex 1305.3 provides a similar normative framework for
the procurement bid disputes. The Annex is comprised of ten basic prin-
ciples reflecting the ideals of flexibility, efficient and effective dispute res-
olution, and timeliness. The first of the principles is that complaints may
be lodged at any time up to and including the award of the contract, and
may involve any aspect of the bid process.3 4 Second, direct resolution of
any complaint between the complainant and the contracting agency is
encouraged before the dispute is referred to the Board.3" However, com-
plainants need not attempt to resolve their disputes with the relevant
government agency before directly submitting the dispute to the Board.
Third, the complainant may seek all other possible relief in addition to
that offered by the Board.36 Fourth, bid challenges are to be considered
in an impartial and timely manner.37 Fifth, the reviewing authority (the
Board) should have no "substantial interest" in the outcome of the dis-
pute3" and sixth, the Board's authority is to engage in a timely investiga-
tion of the complaint and determine the appropriate remedy which may
include postponing, resoliciting or terminating the contract.3 9 Seventh,
the Board is authorized to make recommendations concerning all com-
ponents of the procurement process in order to ensure that the process is
consistent with Chapter 13's obligations.' These recommendations
should normally be followed by the relevant government agency. Eighth,
31 FTA, Chapter 13, Article 1305 (2)(c).
32 FTA, Chapter 13, Article 1303 (2).
33 FTA, Chapter 13, Article 1305 (3). "Transparency" is the condition where all the details and
rules of the game are known at the outset.
34 FTA, Chapter 13, Annex 1305.3 (a).
35 FTA, Chapter 13, Annex 1305.3 (b).
36 FTA, Chapter 13, Annex 1305.3 (c).
37 FTA, Chapter 13, Annex 1305.3 (d).
38 FTA, Chapter 13, Annex 1305.3 (e).
39 FTA, Chapter 13, Annex 1305.3 (f).
40 FTA, Chapter 13, Annex 1305.3 (g).
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decisions of the Board are to be in writing and provided in a timely fash-
ion as well as made available to all interested parties.41 Ninth, both the
U.S. and Canada are to specify in writing all bid challenge procedures.42
Finally, Annex 1305.3 provides that the two parties may modify the bid
challenge procedures in conformity with Chapter 13."
C. FTA Implementation Act Section 19: The Board's Remedies
Section 19 of the Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act speci-
fies the remedies available to complainants. The Board may only recom-
mend remedies to the appropriate government agency. It cannot enforce
the remedies, nor can it require an agency to implement its recommenda-
tions.' The remedies available to the Board are divided into two major
categories: recommendations to the contracting agency and awards to
the complainant. 45
Under Section 19, the Board may, in accordance with Section 17,
recommend any one or all of the following remedies to the relevant
agency: new solicitation and bidding for contracts, re-evaluation of bids,
termination of contracts, payment of appropriate compensation to com-
plainants ("appropriate" being determined by the Board), and award of
contracts to complainants.' The Board may also recommend that com-
plainants be awarded the "reasonable costs" of filing and proceeding with
dispute complaints and of preparing bids.47
D. The Procurement Review Board Regulations
The third and final component of the criteria against which PRB
decisions may be analyzed is the PRB regulations governing the opera-
tion of the Board. Part II of the Regulations (Section 38, Determina-
tions) specifically states that the PRB is to consider all circumstances
41 FrA, Chapter 13, Annex 1305.3 (h).
42 FrA, Chapter 13, Annex 1305.3 (i).
43 FrA, Chapter 13, Annex 1305.3 ).
44 FTA Implementation Act, § 19.
45 Under § 19, recommendations and awards may be made by the Board when it finds that the
procurement process does not comply with the requirements specified in Section 17 of the FTA
Implementation Act. Section 17 of the Act states that Board resolution of bid disputes is to be made
by determining "whether the requirements of Article 1305 of the Agreement and such other proce-
dural requirements as are prescribed have been complied with in respect to the procurement that is
the subject matter of the complaint." Article 1305, as noted earlier, outlines the "procedural obliga-
tions" of the two signatories.
46 FTA Implementation Act, Part II, § 19(1)(a).
47 FIA Implementation Act, Part II, § 19 (1)(b). Section 19 (2) provides that the funds for
awards to complainants are to be paid from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. The Treasury Board is
to determine the government appropriation against which the awards are to be charged.
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surrounding the procurement process in making its determination. The
regulations identify four components of these circumstances to be consid-
ered: the seriousness of the procurement deficiency, the degree of preju-
dice to all interested parties or to the "integrity and efficiency of the
competitive procurement system," the good faith of the parties, and the
extent to which the contract in dispute has been performed.4"
IV. AREAS OF ANALYSIS: LOOKING AT THE BOARD's DECISIONS
FROM FIVE DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES
A. The Board and Bid Disputes Involving Non-Canadian Suppliers
Any initial inquiry into whether the Board is fulfilling Canada's ob-
ligations under the FTA must focus on Canada's agreement to accord
United States goods "treatment no less favorable than the most favorable
treatment accorded its own goods."4 9 Whether this standard is being up-
held can be examined by analyzing bid disputes involving Canadian and
United States suppliers. If United States firms are prevailing in disputes
adjudicated by the Board in accordance with criteria established in the
FTA, the FTA Implementation Act and the PRB Regulations, it is an
indication, admittedly not dispositive, that the Board is acting in accord-
ance with the standard. Such accordance, in turn, may be seen as an
indication that the Board is upholding the larger goal of Chapter 13 to
create an open government procurement system.
However, only one of the nine cases adjudicated by the Board in
1990 involved a United States company. In In The Matter Of. A Com-
plaint by Bio-Temp Scientific Inc., the Department of Supply and Serv-
ices (DSS), the Canadian government's procurement agency, awarded a
$Cdn 140,522 contract to Burnsco Technologies, Inc. of Ontario to pro-
vide a one cubic meter "environmental test chamber."50 Bio-Temp, a
Florida manufacturer, filed a complaint with the Board arguing that it
was the lowest bidder with a compliant proposal and should have been
awarded the contract.
The Board's investigation into the dispute identified DSS' four rea-
sons for denying Bio-Temp the contract award. The DSS argued that
Bio-Temp had no prior experience in constructing environmental test
chambers, that it did not want to be Bio-Temp's "guinea pig"5 in devel-
48 PRB Regulations, Part II, § 38.
49 FrA, Chapter 13, Article 1305 (1).
50 The end user, or agency that was to use the product after it was supplied, was the engineering
unit of the Land Engineering Test Establishment of the Department of National Defense.
51 In the Matter of: A Complaint by Bio-Temp Scientific Inc., No. E90PRF66W9-238-003 at 12
(PRB of Canada June 1, 1990) [hereinafter Bio-Temp].
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oping expertise in this area, that the firm lacked a service support system
in Canada and that the awardee, Burnsco, had both a "proven track rec-
ord in this area of engineering and a canadian [sic] service network
should anything go wrong."5 2
The Board explored each of these four contentions and concluded
that they were an attempt to "provide a paper justification for overlook-
ing the low bidder."53 The Board then reviewed the entire procurement
process and found that DSS violated the principles and regulations of
Chapter 13 on numerous occasions during the procurement process.
Among the most significant of the violations were DSS' failure to specify
in advance the criteria to be used in evaluation and elimination of the
bidders, and the Department's unequal application of decision criteria
among the bidders.54 The Board noted that this violated Paragraph 2 of
Article 1305 of Chapter 13.11
In addition, the Board discovered that Burnsco received its bid
packet before other potential suppliers, also a violation of Paragraph 2,
Article 1305. The Board isolated two additional problems with the pro-
curement process. These problems did not involve transgressions of spe-
cific procurement obligations or regulations so much as violate the
normative principles established under Chapter 13, the relevant sections
of the FTA Implementation Act and the PRB Regulations. These
problems involved the Department's handling of taxes and duties used in
calculating total bid costs and the award of progress payments to
Burnsco.
The DSS' Request for Proposals (RFP) specifically instructed U.S.
suppliers not to add Canadian duty and sales tax to their bid totals. Ca-
nadian suppliers, on the other hand, were to include these charges.56 The
Department, in evaluating all bids, however, would have to add duties
and sales tax to the United States suppliers' bids to be able to compare
them with the Canadian bids. DSS failed publicly to specify precisely
how the duty and tax costs would be added to the United States bids.
That failure, according to the Board, was a violation of the goal of
"transparency," or creation of a system where all the rules and criteria
are known to the players from the outset.
The DSS also failed to specify in its Request for Proposals that the
progress payments awarded to Burnsco were the anticipated means of
52 Id
53 Id at 17.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 18.
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paying the suppliers. The Board argued that had the government made
bidders aware of the fact that it planned to offer periodic payments for
work completed by the winning bidder, more companies would have en-
tered bids because progress payments reduce interest costs by improving
suppliers' cash flow and by limiting the amount of money they have to
borrow. Thus, the Board concluded, offering progress payments could
have "affected significantly" the prices bid, and the "order of the bid
standing."'5 7 The Board noted that the possibility of receiving lower bids
due to the availability of progress payments raised what it termed a "co-
rollary point:" specifically, whether the government "got value for
money for the concession it granted.
58
Based on its findings, the Board ruled that Bio-Temp, the Florida
manufacturer, would have been awarded the contract if the procurement
process had been carried out in accordance with Chapter 13. Conse-
quently, it recommended that the contract with Burnsco be terminated
and re-awarded to Bio-Temp. If that were not feasible, the Board argued
that the ruling would "at least arm the parties with a recognition of their
rights and allow them scope to make such arrangements as can properly
be made in recognition thereof."59 In addition, the Board recommended
that Bio-Temp be awarded the cost of filing and proceeding with its com-
plaint as well as its bid preparation costs. However, the Board noted that
if Bio-Temp were to be awarded the contract, the bid preparation costs
should be deducted from the value of the contract.
In Bio-Temp, the Board provided precisely the type of protection
envisioned in Chapter 13. The Board's investigation revealed that DSS'
procurement process was rife with errors. The Department repeatedly
violated the government's obligations under Chapter 13 and the princi-
ples and norms of open government procurement. The Board, however,
consistent with the principles of Annex 1305.3, Principles Guiding Bid
Challenge Procedures, did not limit the scope of its inquiry to Bio-
Temp's complaint, but examined "all facets of the procurement pro-
cess"6 and made specific recommendations to DSS by pointing out its
failure to follow and uphold FTA procedures, obligations and principles.
It identified potentially unfair practices such as the early release of the
bid packet, highlighted the need to make all the rules of the process clear
to participants by criticizing the progress payments provisions and the
ambiguity surrounding the tax and duty calculations, and reenforced the
57 Id.
58 Id. at 20.
59 Id. at 23.
60 FTA, Chapter 13, Annex 1305.3 (g).
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need to select the lowest compliant bidder, regardless of the source of the
bid.
Of the nine cases decided by the Board in 1990, Bio-Temp is the
only one in which the Board recommended the re-awarding of a con-
tract. The fact that the Board recommended this remedy in the only case
involving a United States supplier, and made its recommendation in
favor of the United States supplier, is noteworthy. The Board thereby
indicated that it is ready to award non-Canadian firms the most far-
reaching remedy available, even at the expense of Canadian companies.
It sent a clear message to United States suppliers that the Board will not
sacrifice their claims and interests to those of a Canadian supplier in ad-
judicating bid disputes. In doing so, the Board upheld the non-discrimi-
natory objectives of Chapter 13.
B. Board Jurisdiction
One case, however, is an insufficient measuring stick for assessing
the performance of the Board. 'The Board's actions in determining and
defining the scope of its jurisdiction provide another insight into this
area.
The Board confronted the issue of defining its jurisdiction shortly
after its creation.61 The manner in which the Board resolved this issue is
consistent with the purposes, principles and objectives of Chapter 13.
At first glance, the jurisdiction of the Board appears tightly circum-
scribed by Section 15 of the FTA Implementation Act. Section 15 pro-
vides that complaints may be filed with the Board in
relation to any aspect of the procurement relating to a contract awarded or
a contract to be awarded by a government institution where the contract is
prescribed or is of a prescribed class of contracts and has a value that
a) exceeds the amount of the threshold fixed by Article 1304 of the Agree-
ment or such lesser amount as may be prescribed;
b) is less than the amount of the threshold of the Code referred to in Arti-
cle 1304 of the Agreement or such greater amount as may be prescribed. 62
The threshold amounts fixed in Article 1304 are $25,000 ($Cdn
31,000) and $171,000 ($Cdn 213,000). Consequently, a disputed pro-
curement of the prescribed class that has a value of at least $25,000
($Cdn 31,000) and not more than the upper limit of $171,000 ($Cdn
213,000) falls within the Board's jurisdiction.63 In In The Matter Of- A
Complaint by Cardinal Industrial Electronics Ltd. (Cardinal 1), the
61 The issue of the Board's jurisdiction was addressed in Cardinal I, supra note 10.
62 FTA Implementation Act, Section 15.
63 Cardinal I, supra note 10, at 1.
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Board decided that such a simplistic determination of its jurisdiction was
unrealistic. In Cardinal 1, Cardinal Industrial claimed that it was the
lowest bidder in a contract for "power supplies" for the Canadian em-
bassy in San Jose, Costa Rica and that the winning bid did not comply
with the terms and conditions of the bid solicitation. When the govern-
ment published the notice of this "proposed procurement" it was coded
in such a way as to indicate that its value was likely to fall between the
Board's jurisdictional thresholds."4 However, the contract was awarded
to Webster Instruments Ltd. at a value of $Cdn 16,544,6' below the mini-
mum threshold of $Cdn 31,000. Citing this fact, the Board dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.66
The Board then reversed its ruling and developed a new interpreta-
tion of Section 15, declaring that the Board did indeed have jurisdiction.
The Board then issued a ruling in the dispute.
The Board justified its reconsideration of the Cardinal I case on four
grounds, all predicated upon the belief that the benefits of reviewing the
decision outweighed the costs. The Board noted that its decision to dis-
miss the case could have been corrected by a superior court; the Board
was being reasonable in correcting its own error so that an appeal could
proceed upon its merits and not a technicality; the decision to review the
dismissal made sense because neither party was harmed due to its reli-
ance on the dismissal; and that the resolution of jurisdictional questions
was important because it had implications regarding what future cases
could be adjudicated by the Board.
The Board's concern with Section 15 stemmed from language that a
supplier may file a complaint regarding "any aspect of the procurement
relating to a contract awarded or a contract to be awarded .... ,,67 The
Board's problem arose because according to its understanding of the sec-
ond half of the clause ("or a contract to be awarded"), if the bid dispute
arose before the contact was awarded, there technically was no contract
value to be used in determining whether procurement fell within the pre-
scribed thresholds of Section 15.68 The Board concluded that Parlia-
ment's intent in creating Section 15 was to include disputes regarding
contracts yet to be awarded as well as disputes involving contracts al-
64 Notice of the proposed procurement was published on June 7, 1989 in Government Business
Opportunities, a newspaper identifying procurement opportunities to prospective suppliers. The
tendering code for the procurement was F-07, indicating the expectation that it would fall under the
provisions of the FTA. Cardinal I, supra note 10, at 1.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 2.
67 Id. at 5.
68 Id. at 6.
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ready awarded within the jurisdiction of the Board, regardless of the dif-
ficulty posed by the language of Section 15.
The Board, after considering a number of alternatives, decided upon
an interpretation of the jurisdictional rule in Section 15 that it claimed
met the criteria of equity, transparency and commercial predictability.
Under this interpretation, the Board has jurisdiction where a governmen-
tal agency estimates that the value of the contract at the time of the in-
ception of the procurement or at the time of the publication of the
"Notice of Proposed Procurement" (NPP) is likely to fall within the dol-
lar thresholds of Article 1304, "regardless of the actual value of any con-
tract awarded and whether the complaint is brought before or after any
such award."6 9 According to this new rule, what is essential is the origi-
nal estimated value of the procurement, not its final contract value.
This is indeed equitable, transparent and predictable. Under this
rule all procurement will be treated the same way if estimated to fall
within the thresholds. The coverage of the FTA will not vary depending
on the value of the actual bids received. In addition, suppliers will now
know the rules of the game from the start. If a procurement is estimated
to fall within the FTA range, it will always be covered by the FA. This
fosters predictability because suppliers can rely on a certain set of appeal
standards once an initial cost estimate has been made by the purchasing
agency.
In formulating its position, the Board worried about the unpredict-
ability of a bid dispute resolution system, and its impact on suppliers,
where a procurement would be highlighted in a government publication
as falling within the ambit of the FTA only to see it excluded from FA
control if its actual value dipped below $Cdn 31,000 or exceeded $Cdn
213,000. In such cases, a complainant, who at the outset of the process
believed it had resort to the FA appeal process if anything went wrong
with the bid, would lose the right to appeal a dispute to the Board
through no fault of its own. The winning supplier would also be immune
to the scrutiny of the Board. This immunity would be a chance occur-
rence and the Board considered it to be a "windfall" to the supplier.70
Similarly, if a procurement, originally not expected to reach the mini-
mum threshold for FTA jurisdiction, actually attained that threshold, it
is unlikely that many suppliers would have bid on it because it would not
have been published as a NPP in Government Business Opportunities
and thus its existence would not be widely known.71
69 Id. at 19.




However, the Board noted in its decision in Cardinal I that its new
interpretation of the jurisdictional rule in Section 15 "flies in the face of
the language of Section 15 that seems relatively cle.. .(viz)- that where
the value of the awarded contract falls between the thresholds the Board
has jurisdiction. ' 72 The Board, noting that a literal interpretation of the
clause leads to an "absurd result, '7 stood by its revision because it con-
forms to the FTA's "true intent and purpose" and "covers (so far as
presently appears) all the known types of procurement that must be ca-
tered for." I
While the Board's decision in Cardinal I may conform to the princi-
ples of equity, transparency and commercial predictability, the Board's
initial decision to reconsider the case may owe its genesis more to realpo-
litik than anything else. As a bureaucracy interested in its own survival
and success, the Board may have realized that it was more advantageous
to set its own jurisdictional limits rather than allow a third party to do
so. A third party might have restricted the cases that the Board could
consider which would have limited the Board's authority and promi-
nence. In contrast, by reconsidering its decision to dismiss the complaint
in Cardinal 1, the Board itself was able to set the parameters of its pow-
ers. Furthermore, the decision ultimately reached by the Board broadly
construed the powers granted it by the Canadian Parliament in Section
15 of the FTA Implementation Act to include the power to adjudicate
disputes involving contracts yet to be awarded.
Consistent with this flexible approach to defining its own jurisdic-
tion, the Board sent a signal in its final 1990 decision that it will not be
rigidly formalistic in deciding whether a complaint has satisfied the crite-
ria for consideration by the Board. In In the Matter of. A Complaint by
Earl C. McDermid Limited, Paper Converters75, the Department of Sup-
ply and Services (DSS) argued that the complaint violated Section 23 (1)
of the PRB Regulations in that it was filed more than ten days after the
basis for the complaint was known or should have been known by the
complainant. The DSS also argued that the complaint violated Section
21(1)(f) in that it was not "concise and logically arranged" and did "not
contain a clear and detailed statement of the substantive and factual
grounds of the complaint." 76
72 Id at 20.
73 Id
74 Id.
75 In the Matter of: A Complaint by Earl C. McDermid Ltd., No. E90PRF6608-021-0012 (PRB
of Canada Dec. 11, 1990) [hereinafter McDermid II]. This is the second of two cases involving the
Board and Earl C. McDermid Ltd.
76 Id. at 2.
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The Board found that the complaint was filed approximately seven-
teen days after it ruled the complainant should have known of the basis
for its complaint.77 In addition, analyzing the content of the complaint,
the Board noted that the "letter of complaint is perhaps not organized to
facilitate instant clarity, and is not free from unrelated and judgmental
[sic] matter."7 " These findings, however, did not keep the Board from
considering the complaint.
The Board observed that the PRB Regulations permit it to consider
complaints that fail to meet the time limitations contained in the rules if
"good cause is shown or where it is determined that a complaint raises
issues significant to the procurement system ... ."I' The Board justified
its acceptance of the complaint on the ground that it involved the allega-
tion that the lowest bidder in a procurement was overlooked. The Board
stated, "[H]ardly any issue can be more significant to the procurement
system than an allegation that the evaluation by-passed the lowest bid-
der."8 In addition, the Board noted that the complaint was significant
in that it was the first to involve three critical issues: taxes, duties, and
origin of goods in bid evaluations.8"
The Board noted that while the PRB Regulations seem to require
that complaints be concise and logically arranged, it would interpret the
requirement "with reasonable flexibility so that it does not result in
proper complaints being rejected on overly technical grounds - particu-
larly, as here, where the procurements are of modest amounts, the com-
plainants act on their own behalf, without sophisticated assistance, legal
or otherwise ...."82
The Board, trying to strike a balance, also stated that it would not
interpret the regulation "so loosely as to effectively allow the complaint
system to be encumbered with trivial, frivolous, incomprehensible or
even vexatious complaints."83
C. Remedies: How the Board Has Rewarded Prevailing Parties
The results in the nine cases adjudicated by the Board in 1990 fall
into three categories: determinations that the complainant has not pre-
vailed in its complaint and therefore should not receive any compensa-
77 Id. at 3.
78 Id.
79 PRD Regulations, 23 (4), Time Limit for Filing a Complaint.
80 McDermid II, supra note 75, at 3.
81 Id.




tion,8 determinations that the procurement process violated the FTA by
overlooking an identifiable lowest bidder,"5 and determinations that the
procurement violated the FTA where identification of a lowest bidder is
unclear.8 6 The remedies awarded by the Board within each of these cate-
gories are consistent, with one noteworthy exception. The Board has
been inconsistent in awarding complainants the cost of preparing their
contract bids. However, the overall general consistency of the Board's
remedies is an indication that the Board is achieving a basic level of pre-
dictability and even transparency in providing remedies.
For example, where the Board determines that the complainant has
not prevailed in its case and there has been no violation of the FTA, the
Board dismisses the case and awards no compensation. 7
Where, on the other hand, the Board determines that the procure-
ment process has violated FTA regulations or principles, the Board's
remedy depends on whether the procurement overlooked a clear, lowest-
compliant bidder in the process. If it is clear from its investigation that
the complainant would have won the disputed contract, the Board orders
termination of the award and reawards the contract.88 This scenario is
sometimes complicated, however. If the Board finds that the lowest bid-
der has been overlooked and the contract has been completed in the in-
terim, the Board awards the complainant expectation damages and the
cost of filing and proceeding with its complaint.8 9 This remedy is consis-
tent with the reawarding of the contract because expectation damages
place the complainant in the position it would have been in had it been
awarded the contract. However, because the contract has already been
performed, the complainant cannot be awarded the contract. The Board
calculated the expectation damages in Cardinal II to equal the profit the
84 See In the Matter of: A Complaint by Blowey-Henry (Wholesale) Ltd., No. E90PRF6638-
021-0002 (PRB of Canada May 8, 1990) [hereinafter Blowey-Henry].
85 See Bio-Temp, supra note 51; Cardinal I, supra note 10; In the Matter of: A Complaint by
Repco Data Inc., No. E90PRF66M9-021-0014 (PRB of Canada Nov. 16, 1990) [hereinafter Repco];
and In the Matter of: A Complaint by Earl C. McDermid, Ltd., No. E90PRF6635-021-0013 (PRB
of Canada Nov. 1, 1990) [hereinafter McDermid I].
86 See In the Matter of: A Complaint by HJ. Reis Int. Ltd. No. D90PRF6601-021-0001 (PRB of
Canada Apr. 9, 1990) [hereinafter Reis]; In the Matter of: A Complaint by Cardinal Instustrial
Electronics Ltd., No. E90PRF66W9-021-0009 (PRB of Canada Aug. 23, 1990) [hereinafter Cardinal
II]; In the Matter of: A Complaint by LANsPLUS, Inc. No. D89PRF6608-021-0006 (PRE of Can-
ada Jan. 18, 1990) [hereinafter LANsPLUS]; and McDermid II, supra note 75.
87 See Blowey-Henry, supra note 84.
88 See Bio-Temp, supra note 51.
89 Cardinal I, supra note 10. In Cardinal I, the company that was awarded the contract, Web-
ster Instruments Limited, had fully performed the contract and delivered the required goods to the
Department of Supply and Services by the time the Board made its determination. Id. at 35.
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complainant would have received if awarded the contract. 9
In an unusual case where the government received only one bid after
twice soliciting bids for bagged softwood shavings and then rejected the
offer as too expensive, the Board recommended that the government ne-
gotiate with the complainant "to determine what is fair value to the
Crown for goods requested in its original solicitation and proceed with
the procurement in accordance with established procedures in light of
the results obtained." 91
Where the Board determines that the procurement violated FTA
standards but is unable to determine who would have been awarded the
disputed bid, the Board attempts to recreate a level playing field and re-
store the complainant to its pre-bid position. This is generally done by
recommending that the procurement be resolicited.92 This recommenda-
tion has even been made when a contract was awarded to another firm.
93
In addition, in order to hold the complainants harmless, in light of
the government's errors in these procurement processes, the Board can
offer two additional remedies: compensation for complainants' reason-
able costs of filing and proceeding with their complaints before the
Board94 and reimbursement of complainants' bid preparation costs. Un-
like its actions in reawarding contracts, granting expectation damages,
and recommending resolicitation of procurement bids, the Board has
been inconsistent in the award of bid preparation costs.
For example, in Cardinal II the Board declared,
There is the question of whether the complainant should also be awarded
bid preparation costs. Normally, bid preparation is a cost of doing busi-
ness. The Board has awarded such costs in the past, however, in cases
where it is plain that, but for the government's actions, the complainant
would have won the contract.95
While Cardinal H was the Board's sixth decision and the third time that
90 Id. at 39.
91 Repco, supra note 85, at 14.
92 See Reis, supra note 86, and Cardinal II, supra note 86.
93 See Cardinal II, supra note 86, McDermid H, supra note 75. In Cardinal 11 the Board recom-
mended that the contract for work station grounding kits awarded to Patton Aircraft and Industries,
Ltd. be canceled and the procurement recompeted. Before the resolicitation, however, the Board
recommended that the Department of Supply and Services clarify within its procurement plan the
"mandatory and desirable features" of the kits and the "relative importance of evaluation criteria."
Cardinal II, supra note 86, at 19. In McDermid II, the Board recommended cancellation of a con-
tractual arrangement known as a "Regional Individual Standing Offer" (RISO) for the supply of
facsimile paper awarded to a Quebec firm. The Board then recommended that the contract be resol-
icited. McDermid II, supra note 75, at 21.
94 See Reis, supra note 86; Cardinal I, supra note 10; LANsPLUS, supra note 86; and McDermid
II, supra note 75.
95 Cardinal II, supra note 86, at 20.
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it had recommended the award of bid preparation costs96, it was the first
time that the Board clearly enunciated a criterion for the award of these
costs.
In awarding bid preparation costs in Cardinal I the Board simply
stated:
Compensation Issues: Accordingly, the complainant, having been success-
ful in establishing the case before us, the Board intends, firstly, to award
reasonable costs of filing and proceeding with the complaint and secondly,
to award the complainant reasonable costs related to the preparation of
their bids.97
In Bio-Temp, the Board announced the award of bid preparation
costs in a similar fashion. The Board stated:
Since the complainant has been substantially successful in this complaint,
the Board intends to award them [sic] their costs in pursuing this com-
plaint. They are entitled as well to an award of reasonable costs relating to
the preparation of their bid.98
In Cardinal I and Bio-Temp the Board ruled that the complainants
were the lowest bidders but had been overlooked by the government.
Consequently, the statement in Cardinal II explaining the criterion for
the award of bid preparation costs is consistent with the decision in these
two cases. However, the Board has not always been clear in explaining
its award of bid preparation costs and has even acted inconsistently with
its statement in Cardinal II.
In Reis, for example, the Board awarded the complainant the rea-
sonable costs of filing and proceeding with its complaint and recom-
mended that the contract be re-solicited. 99 In explaining why it did not
award bid preparation costs, the Board cited two criteria that have noth-
ing to do with the justification provided in Cardinal II or the language
the Board used in Cardinal I and Bio-Temp. In Reis, the Board stated:
The Board will not award the complainant its cost of preparing its bids in
the two flawed solicitations because in the first of these, they [sic] may not
have submitted a compliant bid (a point which is expressly not determined
because of the ambiguity of the RFP); and in the second, because the bid
was submitted with the knowledge that this purported to be a 'no substi-
tute' solicitation. 00
Furthermore, in Cardinal II, the Board contradicted its statement in
this very same case that bid preparation costs are a "cost of doing busi-
ness" and are awarded "in cases where it is plain that, but for the govern-
96 Bid preparation costs were also recommended in Cardinal I and Bio-Temp.
97 Cardinal I, supra note 10, at 35.
98 Bio-Temp, supra note 51, at 23.
99 Reis, supra note 86, at 11.
100 Id. at 10.
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ment's actions, the complainant would have won the contract." 10 1 The
Board awarded Cardinal half of its bid preparation costs in spite of its
finding "[tihat outcome [that but for the government's actions, the com-
plainant would have won the contract] is not clear in this case because, as
already noted, it is not certain that if the government had played by its
rules, Cardinal would have won." (Emphasis in original.)" 2
Based on this finding, the Board denied the complainant's request
for termination of the contract or cash compensation. 10 3 However, the
Board continued, stating that the procurement involved the provisions of
the FTA, GATT Code on Government Procurement and the Depart-
ment of Supply and Services and that "bidders should be able to expect
fair treatment by the government in all stages of the procurement pro-
cess.' 10 4 Finding that bidders were not accorded such treatment and
that some of the problems experienced in the procurement were the com-
plainant's fault, the Board declared it was "inclined to divide responsibil-
ity between the complainant and the government and award the
complainant half its bid preparation costs." 10 5
This decision contradicts the earlier statement made by the Board in
Cardinal II that it would award bid preparation costs where it is clear
that the complainant would have prevailed. The fact that the procure-
ment falls under the rubric of the FTA and GATT should not make a
difference. All of the complaints before the Board fall under the purview
of these two agreements. If this were a criterion for the award of bid
preparation costs, then bid preparation costs should have also been
awarded in LANsPLUS where the Board concluded that the procure-
ment violated FTA guidelines but was unable to determine that
LANsPLUS would have won the bid. Instead, LANsPLUS only re-
ceived the cost of filing and proceeding with its complaint.
Unfortunately, the Board has failed to clarify this confusion in deci-
sions since Cardinal II. In its last decision in 1990, McDermid 11,106 the
Board recommended canceling a Regional Individual Standing Offer
(RISO) for facsimile paper and resoliciting the procurement. The Board
awarded McDermid the reasonable costs associated with filing and pro-
ceeding with its complaint. The Board stated, "because it appears that




105 Id The Board noted that Cardinal had exacerbated the difficulties encountered in the pro-
curement process by submitting a bid that contained errors as well as an unclear statement of the
performance capacity of the company's proposal. Id. at 18.
106 McDermid II was decided December 11, 1990.
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the complainant, but for the actions of the government, may have been
the low bidder in this situation, the Board also awards the complainant
its reasonable costs relating to the preparation of its bids.""0 7
The Board's decision in McDennid II may indicate a shifting of the
Board's criterion for awarding bid preparation costs, from the standard
articulated in Cardinal 11 where it is "plain that, but for the govern-
ment's actions, the complainant would have won the contract," 1 8 to
procurements where the complainant "may have been the lowest
bidder., , "o
This "may have been" standard, although not articulated until the
McDermid 11 decision, is closer to the criterion the Board actually ap-
plied in Cardinal II than the standard it claimed it invoked. The Board
in Cardinal I declared, "... it is not certain that if the government had
played by the rules, Cardinal would have won." (Emphasis in origi-
nal.)110 Evidently, the Board could not determine that Cardinal was the
lowest bidder, nor could it rule out that possibility. Cardinal, therefore,
may have been the lowest bidder. Awarding bid preparation costs in sit-
uations where the complainant may have been the lowest bidder in effect
reduces the "burden of proof" on behalf of the complainants and is likely
to be welcomed by firms bringing disputes before the Board. However,
this standard presents problems of predictability and transparency.
It is unclear exactly what the Board means by the phrase "may have
been the lowest bidder." Nor is it clear what must be proven for the
complainant to prevail. Does the Board only have to come to the conclu-
sion that it is unable to ascertain a lowest bidder and therefore any com-
plainant who prevails by showing that the procurement violated the FTA
satisfies the "may have been" criterion? Or does the complainant have to
show that while it may not be possible to isolate with complete certainty
who the lowest bidder was, none of the other compliant bidders involved
in the procurement underbid its offer? This second standard places a
more rigorous burden on the complainant. Could the "may have been"
standard result in two firms receiving their'bid preparation costs if their
bids were identical? If the Board were confronted with such a situation
and did not award both firms their bid preparation costs, wouldn't this
violate the "may have been standard" because both firms may have been
the lowest bidder?
A clear articulation of the standard is important if the Board is com-
107 McDermid II, supra note 75, at 21.
108 Cardinal II, supra note 86, at 20.
109 McDernid II, supra note 75, at 21.
110 Cardinal II, supra note 86, at 20.
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mitted to the principles of equity, predictability and transparency. Firms
have a right to know what is required of them in order to receive the
costs of preparing their bids in a procurement process that has not com-
plied with FTA rules or principles.
The Board's award to Cardinal of half its bid preparation costs is
less troubling than the fact that compensation was offered at all. While
there is no specific provision in Chapter 13, the FTA Implementation
Act or the PRB Regulations providing for "half" awards, the recom-
mendation can be viewed as consistent with both the FTA Implementa-
tion Act and the PRB Regulations. Section 19 of the FTA
Implementation Act first provides that the Board, in making its determi-
nations, has the power to recommend awards to complainants and to
determine the "appropriate amount of such compensation."11' Building
on this base, Section 38 of the PRB Regulations provides that in making
its determination, the Board is to consider the "seriousness of the defi-
ciency in the procurement" and "the degree of prejudice" to the par-
ties.112 Cardinal's errors in the procurement process can be seen as
mitigating both the deficiency in the government's procurement activities
and any "prejudice" that would befall Cardinal. Consequently, half of
the bid preparation costs could be seen as an "appropriate amount" for
the award.
Aside from the issue of bid preparation costs, the Board's awards of
remedies is generally consistent. A number of specific cases illustrate the
Board's consistent application of the FTA obligations, principles and
regulations in providing remedies in bid disputes. For example, as noted
above, the Board recommended contract termination in the Bio-Temp
case and expectation damages in Cardinal I. In both cases, the Board
ruled that the complainant would have prevailed if open procurement
processes consistent with the FTA had been followed. However, in spite
of the similarity of the Board's determination, two different remedies
were recommended. The reason for this divergence in remedies lies in
the Board's application of Section 38 of Part II of the PRB Regulations.
This regulation specifies that in making its determinations, the Board is
to consider, among other things, "the extent to which the contract in
dispute has been performed.""' 3 In Bio-Temp, the contract awarded had
yet to be completed, whereas the contract in Cardinal I had been per-
formed. In the latter case, it made no sense for the Board to recommend
that the contract be re-awarded as it recommended in Bio-Temp, so the
111 FTA Implementation Act, Part II, Section 19.
112 PRB Regulations, Section 38.
113 PRB Regulations, Part II, Section 38.
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financial equivalent was propQsed: the award of expectation damages (i.e.
placing the complainant in the position it would have been in if it had
been awarded the contract, including the profits that the complainant
would have made under the contract).
D. Procedural and Administrative Issues
The Procurement Review Board's decisions may also be analyzed in
terms of their consistency with the procedural and administrative guide-
lines of Chapter 13 of the FTA, the FTA Implementation Act and the
PRB Regulations.
The Board decisions have fulfilled these procedural and administra-
tive obligations. All nine decisions, in accordance with PRB Regulations
39 (1) and 40 (2) were rendered in the requisite ninety days after the
complaint was filed or the forty-five days for expedited proceedings.
More importantly, with the possible exception of Reis14, all of the
Board's decisions are consistent with PRB Regulation Section 38 which
provides "[i]n making appropriate determination on a complaint, the
Board shall consider all circumstances surrounding the procurement or
proposed procurement ... ,"115
The impact of this consistency is both significant and far reaching.
In the eight cases other than ReisI 6, the Board did not limit its inquiry
solely to the issues raised by the complainant. In determining whether
the complainant would prevail, it analyzed the entire procurement pro-
cess. In doing so, it exposed violations of the FTA on the part of the
procuring agencies that would not have been isolated if it limited the
scope of its inquiry to solely the issues raised in the complaint. The find-
ings of these broadly structured investigations were incorporated not
only into the Board's determinations but also into its recommendations
to the relevant government procuring agencies. The consequence of this
adherence to PRB Regulation 38 is that the Board was able not only to
adjudicate a bid dispute, but also to identify agency practices beyond the
immediate area of the bid dispute that violate open, efficient, and trans-
parent government procurement.
114 Reis involved the procurement of a tractor for Agriculture Canada. The Board ruled that the
case was "decided upon grounds that make it unnecessary to set out in great detail all of the sur-
rounding circumstances of this procurement." Reis, supra note 86, at 3. The Board ruled that DSS'
failure to comply with two specific provisions of the FTA, its mention of 'no substitute' for the
desired brand product and failure to publish a notice of proposed procurement for the procurement,
was "fatal" to the Department's defense.
115 PRB Regulations, Section 38.
116 These cases are, in chronological order: LANsPLUS, Cardinal I, Cardinal II, Blowey-Henry,
Bio-Temp, McDermid I, Repco, and McDermid II.
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In Cardinal II, for example, the complainant contended that the bid
evaluation for a contract to provide Canadian Forces Supply Depots with
"work station grounding kits" was unsatisfactory because DSS did not
recognize its bid as an "equivalent substitute" for items specified in the
Request for Proposals (RFP).117 Cardinal argued that had the Depart-
ment recognized the equivalence of its product, it would have been
awarded the contract because it was the low bidder.
In settling the bid dispute and reviewing the entire procurement pro-
cess, the Board stated, "[tlhe problems that surround this procurement
start with discrepancies in what the DND [Department of National De-
fense] said they wanted, what DSS said DND wanted and what DND
ultimately (and perhaps always) was prepared to accept. ' 118
The Board also identified a number of specific failings on the part of
the government. First, the RFP specified that the bid award would be
based on a determination of the "best value" to the government. 1 9
However, the government did not develop a set of criteria to determine
what "best value" was. This failure was a direct violation of DSS' Sup-
ply Policy Manual (SPM) Directive 3002 Paragraph 30, which requires
that proposals be analyzed and evaluated consistent with the criteria out-
lined in the RFP. In addition, the RFP also listed "delivery" as a crite-
rion for the evaluation of bids. The Board, however, found that
"delivery was never an important factor in determining supplier respon-
siveness nor as a part of 'best value' assessment."' 20 Finally, the Board
criticized DSS for not calling the complainant to clarify some confusion
regarding its bid, noting that the phone call offered the government the
chance to save up to $Cdn 3,000 on its procurement.
The Board's complete investigation of the procurement process in
Cardinal II is consistent with the obligations and principles of the FrA,
the FTA Implementation Act and the PRB Regulations: in responding
to a specific complaint, it isolated a panoply of behavior that violated the
principles of transparency, equity and predictability and pointed the vio-
lations out to the offending agency so that they might be corrected.
Similarly, in Cardinal I, after ruling that it did, in fact, have juris-
diction, the Board reviewed the entire procurement process before ruling
that the complainant's claim was valid. The dispute in Cardinal I in-
volved a contract for thirty-two "American Power 330 XT, 120 VAC/60
Cycle Uninterruptable Power Supplies" for the Canadian Embassy in
117 Cardinal II, supra note 86, at 16.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 18.
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Costa Rica.121 Cardinal complained that its bid was the lowest and that
the winning bidder's product did "not comply with the terms and condi-
tions of the bid solicitation."'
122
The Board again found that the evaluation criteria for the bids were
not clearly specified in advance and were not applied in a consistent man-
ner. The Department of Supply and Services did not provide all the po-
tential suppliers with "equal opportunity to be responsive to the
requirements of the procuring entity in the tendering and bidding
phase." 123 In addition, DSS required that any product which was offered
as "an equal" to the product specifically requested in the RFP match
every feature of that product. The Board noted that such a requirement
had the effect of making the procurement process one involving "no sub-
stitutes" for the desired good.124 "No substitute" provisions violate the
FTA because specification of a particular brand of product can be used
as a non-tariff barrier to limit suppliers who can respond to the RFP.
E. Impact of the Board's Decisions
Article 19 of the FTA Implementation Act provides that the Board
may recommend "the appropriate remedy" to a governmental institution
where the Board determines that the procurement violated FTA require-
ments. 125 The Board's recommendations do not have the force of law
and agencies are not required to implement them. Annex 1305.3, Princi-
ples Guiding Bid Challenges, only provides that the Board's recommen-
dations should be followed by the relevant government agency. Given
this limited authority, the question arises whether the Board is merely a
paper tiger bureaucracy or whether its decisions help shape a more effi-
cient, transparent and predictable government procurement system.
Because many of the Board's recommendations concern violations
of FTA procedures and obligations, one way to assess the effectiveness of
the Board in creating an open, equitable and transparent procurement
system is to look at whether the relevant government agencies adopted
and implemented the Board's recommendations.
The author's conversations with DSS, the agency most affected by
the Board's recommendations, revealed that the majority of the Board's
recommendations have been implemented. However, the justifications
for failing to adopt the remaining recommendations raise concerns about
121 Cardinal I, supra note 10, at 1.
122 Id. at 2.
123 I. at 32.
124 Id at 33.
125 FTA Implementation Act, Article 19.
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the remedy process in general. These concerns are addressed in the con-
clusion of this comment.
In its first determination, LANsPL US, the Board recommended that
DSS review the extent to which contracting officers understood their re-
sponsibilities regarding the review and acceptance of single source
tendering. 26 The Board also recommended that the Department review
its policies and practices regarding publication of notices of single source
procurement with an eye to increasing procurement transparency and
effectiveness by publishing advance notices.
The DSS reports 27 that it plans to include "sole sourcing" in semi-
nar courses being offered to procurement officers in training sessions dur-
ing the fall and winter of 1990-1991 at the Department. The
Department's Supply Program Management Directorate has explored
the second recommendation but has not implemented it because it feels
that publication of advance notices would lead to a considerable increase
in agency workload and would consequently necessitate the hiring of ad-
ditional personnel.12 The Department is looking for more cost-effective
ways to implement the recommendation.
The DSS has implemented the recommendations made in the Cardi-
nal I and Cardinal II cases. In Cardinal I, the complainant has been
awarded its expectation damages (projected profits of $Cdn 1,386.68)
and the cost of filing and proceeding with its complaint.1 29 In Cardinal
II, the Department canceled the disputed contract and re-tendered it as
recommended by the Board.130
In Bio-Temp, the Department did not terminate the contract and re-
award it to Bio-Temp as recommended by the Board. By the time of the
Board's determination, the contract had been performed to an extent that
made termination unfeasible. Instead, the secondary recommendation of
the Board, financial compensation of Bio-Temp, was implemented. DSS
reports that Bio-Temp was awarded $23,815, representing its potential
profit from the contract.' 3'
In Reis, the Board recommended that a new solicitation for the pro-
curement be issued, that the Department revise its Directive 2005 (No
Substitute Requisitions) to conform with Canada's GATT and FTA obli-
126 Single source tendering is the practice of providing one supplier, a single source, -with the
procurement RFP.
127 Conversation of October 18, 1990 with Garth Cookshaw, Coordinator of PRB Complaints,







gations, and that the complainant be awarded its costs for filing and pro-
ceeding with its complaint. The Department reports that Directive 2005
has been amended, the complainant has been awarded the costs of filing
and proceeding with its complaint, and a new solicitation for the tractor
rental has been undertaken.' 32
In McDermid I, the Board recommended that the Regional Individ-
ual Standing Offer (RISO) for facsimile paper be awarded to the next
lowest bidder if the government still required the paper and the bids were
still open. If this bidder were unable to fulfill the contract, the Board
instructed the government to proceed down the line of bids until a bidder
accepted or "up to the point where the prices offered last May are consid-
ered by the government to no longer represent fair value to the
Crown." '133 If this strategy failed, the Board recommended resoliciting
the requirement. The Board also recommended that the Department of
Supply and Services "review, clarify and correct" Supply Policy Manual
Directive 3005 regarding eligible goods.
Section 3005 has been reviewed and clarified by the Department.
However, because the government's requirement for paper has changed
and the bid offers had expired by the time of the Board's decision, the
Department has consequently resolicited the standing offer.1
34
The Board's recommendations in Repco have also been followed by
the Department. There, the Board suggested that the Department begin
negotiations with Repco to come to terms on an agreeable price for the
softwood shavings sought by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
While no agreement has been reached to date, Repco has modified its bid
offer.
135
Finally, in McDermid II the Board recommended that the RISO
awarded to Rittenhouse Ribbons and Rolls, Ltd. be canceled and resolic-
ited. To date the RISO has not been canceled. In fact, the RISO is being
used by the Department of External Affairs to fulfill its immediate needs
for facsimile paper until a new requisition for resolicitation can be
developed. 136
While the Department of Supply and Services has manifested an in-
tent to comply with the Board's recommendation in McDermid II by
resoliciting the bid, its actions are inconsistent with the principle of eq-
132 Conversation of January 21, 1991 with Garth Cookshaw, Coordinator of PRB Complaints,
Department of Supplies and Services, Canada.
133 McDermid I, supra note 85, at 14.
134 Conversation of January 21, 1991 with Garth Cookshaw, Coordinator of PRB Complaints,
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uity. In McDennid II the Board ruled that -the procurement violated
Section 17 of the FTA Implementation Act and that the contract should
be resolicited. 3 7 Specifically, the Board found that the Department did
not utilize "decision criteria in the evaluation of bids and award of con-
tracts that were clearly specified in advance." '13 8
However, allowing the Department of External Affairs to meet its
current needs through a contract that was the result of a procurement
process that violated the FrA is inequitable. It amounts to a windfall to
the prevailing company and harms the bidder who would have prevailed
if the contract had been awarded in accordance with the FTA.
Government agencies must continue to function despite the Board's
decisions. Undoubtedly, the Department of External Affairs continues to
use and need facsimile paper while the resolicitation is being undertaken.
However, there are other ways for the Department to obtain the paper
than from a contract award that the government has indicated it will not
allow to stand. The Department could prepare a local purchase order to
buy a limited supply of the paper in the local market or it could purchase
the paper from the stocked item supply of the Department of Supply and
Services which contains various office materials. 139
V. CONCLUSION
In its second decision, the Board justified its re-interpretation of the
rule governing its jurisdiction on the ground that the "true purpose" of
the FTA "insofar as it relates to the bid challenge procedure" is:
To implement for Canada, an international undertaking to provide an equi-
table (i.e. procedurally fair), transparent (i.e. all the details of which are
known from the outset), and effective bid challenge system, to facilitate fair
competition, to ensure a predictable commercial environment .... 140
A review of the Board's treatment of the only Canadian - United
States dispute it has confronted, its interpretation and expansion of its
jurisdiction, the remedies it has recommended and the procedural and
administrative consistency of its decisions indicate that with minor ex-
ceptions, the actions of the Board have been consistent with those norms
as well as with the obligations and principles of the FA, the FTA Im-
plementation Act and the PRB Regulations.
Furthermore, at a practical level, the relevant government agencies
137 McDermid II, supra note 75, at 21.
138 Id
139 Conversation of January 28, 1991 with Garth Cookshaw, Coordinator of PRB Complaints,
Department of Supplies and Services, Canada.




have willingly accepted the clear majority of the non-binding recommen-
dations of the Board. The implementation of these recommendations
will likely reinforce procedural compliance with the FTA throughout
Supply and Services Canada. However, the reasons cited by DSS in the
two instances where it has failed to implement recommendations, prior
execution of the contract and the cost of implementation, raise important
questions. The first raises the question whether the complaint process
should be altered to reduce the likelihood that a disputed contract will be
performed before a Board determination is issued or whether such a re-
sult is immaterial as long as the relevant agency compensates a prevailing
complainant with expectation damages. If a purpose of open procure-
ment is to reduce government costs, the only possible answer to the ques-
tion is that the execution of disputed contracts should be curbed.
Otherwise, the government is paying twice for the same service.
There appear to be two possible means of reducing the likelihood
that a disputed contract will be performed during the resolution of the
dispute. Both involve reducing the time in which bid disputes are adjudi-
cated. This can be done by reducing the time in which a complaint can
be brought by a supplier"' or by reducing the period in which the Board
may make its determination142. Given the already short period of time in
which a complainant may bring a dispute and the Board's refusal to rig-
idly apply these time constraints in McDermid II, the latter alternative
may be preferable. However, before such a recommendation is imple-
mented, its impact on the Board's workload and staffing would have to
be analyzed.
In 1990, DSS only refused to implement one Board recommendation
because of cost. Should such a rationalization become more prevalent,
the government, literally, will be confronted with the question of how
much it values the new, international procurement system it has created.
Given the Procurement Review Board's performance in establishing a
system that is effective, transparent and equitable, the government should
be very careful not to underestimate its value.
Charles W. Levesque
141 Under PRB Regulation Section 23 (1) a firm has up to 10 days "after the basis of the com-
plaint is known or should reasonably have been known, which ever is earlier, to bring its complaint."
142 PRB Regulation Section 39 (1) provides 90 days for normal (i.e. non-expedited)
determinations.
